Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Counterfactual conditional: the counterfactual conditional is equivalent to unreal conditional sentences. Conditionals, in which a fact is mentioned in the antecedent, which is not the case. If A were the case, B would have been the case. Counterfactual conditionals are needed because of the indeterminacy of pointing. One cannot unequivocally single out a certain element of a situation. The counterfactual conditional tells us which element would have had to be different in order for a process under examination to have a different outcome.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
III 46
Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong: law statements support counterfactual conditionals (not vice versa) - when the law statements are true, the counterfactual conditionals are true - findings of GF do not support any counterfactual condiditionals - E.g. if Proton P no proton but electron, then repelled by other electron E - Armstrong: but absurd: Counterfactual Conditionals: if P not a philosopher, but electron, then repelled by E - ArmstrongVs: possible worlds in which this is possible have perhaps different laws of physics
III 48
Uniformities: do not support counterfactual conditionals: nevertheless: if by chance an a is selected (who actually is not in the room), he will be wearing a watch - just not, "if he were in the room, he would..."
III ~ 163
Counterfactual conditionals: VsMeinong's Swamp, VsPrecarious Ontology
II 64
Counterfactual conditionals: always negative: if ... had not happened/no empirical evidence - universal counterfactual conditional: = law statement: positive: if ... had happened, empirical evidence possible that supports the truth of the universal counterfactual conditional

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

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> Counter arguments in relation to Counterfactual Conditionals

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-22