|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Wilfrid Sellars on Descriptions - Dictionary of Arguments
Report/statement: phrases like "This is green" both have a facts-declaratory and a reporting use. John must learn to suppress the report. (Report on his own sense impression which contradicts the fact that he has learned) he says now: "this tie is blue". But he makes no reporting use of this sentence. He used it in the sense of a conclusion. (Report: a conclusion, experiences, feelings, sensations - /determination: Facts.
Thesis: that one can translate every statement that contains at least one reference expression and a description expression, into a (fictional) understandable language, that contains the equivalent of reference expressions, but not of description expression, but therefore a special notation for reference terms, in which the description expressions can be translated into. Once again the essence of "mapping" has been proved as a translation. (Mapping/translation)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977