Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately.
- - -
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher).
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear.
- - -
V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description.
V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (p.a. is part of i.a.)- - (s) Reference is not existence assertion.
V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none. Cf. >theory of descriptions.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-01-20
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