Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately.
- - -
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher).
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II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear.
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V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description.
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V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (pA is part of iA) - (s) reference is not existence assertion.
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V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24