Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments
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| Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cresswell I 117 Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. --- Geach I 61 Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. --- Newen/Schrenk I 90 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity. Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided. --- I 92 N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. --- Russell I VIII E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. --- I 46 Labelling/Russell: always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features --- I 96 Labelling/Principia Mathematica/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> Definition). --- III 122 Labelling/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
R I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 R II B. Russell Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 R IV B. Russell Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 R VI B. Russell Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993 R VII B. Russell Wahrheit und Falschheit In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-24