|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences.
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Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. - Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. - Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. - Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them.
Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991