|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Difference picture/description/Goodman: the versions that are pictures and not descriptions have no truth value (true/false, only exists for statements). Pictures cannot be linked by conjunctions.
The uniformity of nature, about which we marvel or the unreliability about which we complain, belongs to a world that we have created ourselves.
Descriptions/Goodman: differ not from pictures by that they are more arbitrary, but they tend to belong to articulated rather than to dense schemes (close: for example, real numbers, articulated/Goodman: the opposite of dense).
Description function/Goodman: E.g. Suppose the movement of the moon. Does it rotate or does it not rotate? Well, yes and no. To say "something is moving relative to something else" does not mean that one does ascribe movement to it. (> motion, > relativity).
When I say that different sides of the moon are facing the sun at different times, that is not a statement about motion, halt or rotation. Movement disappears from the sphere of facts. We produce rotation or resting of the moon.
Fact/Goodman: All facts threaten to dissolve in convention, all nature threatens to dissolve in tricks._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997