Dictionary of Arguments

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Author Item Summary Meta data
Martin II 134
Necessary Causal Relation: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit - contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands - (s) if it did not expand, it would still be water and still freezing - frozen. Not defined by volume, but by Microstructure.
- - -
II (d) 154
Humean View/Place: Logical Relation like Necessity/contingent only between propositions - Causal Relation only between actual and individual situations - Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change) - causal necessity: matter of counterfactual conditionals - in nature no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke) - causal necessity special case of logical necessity - statements about causal necessity always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory - Situations are separated
II (d) 155
Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect - otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-19
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