Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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V 214
Causal story/causal explanation/Lewis: not everything in a causal story is a cause - E.g. sharp curve is not a cause in itself - it causes uncontrolled turning of the steering wheel) - there are several, convergent causal chains - they can have a tree structure. - Causal chains are dense. Cause/everyday language: unclear - depending on the context. - Overall cause/Mill: Lewis Pro: is a cause.
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V 217
Closed: everything on which an event in the (pre-)history depends is itself an event in (pre-)history - but not vice versa: a causal history needs not to be closed - explanation: Information about causal story.
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V 230f
Causal explanation/explanation/coincidence/why-question/Lewis: both are legitimate: a) explaining random events - b) denying that we can explain why this provides one result instead of another - this is not about relative probability - the actual causal story is not different from the unactual one which would have had the other result, if it had happened - there are no properties that distinguish the actual story from the unactual one.
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V 327
Causal counterfactual conditionals/Lewis: can belong to patterns of causal dependence or independence - we get them when we pass from language to propositions.
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Bigelow I 320
Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases.
Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e) need not be explained according to Hempel's style.
Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies that a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely.
BigelowVsProbabilistic Statement (see above) Instead. Approach by Lewis:

Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e9 5 stages:
1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals.
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I 321
2. Uses contrafactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency.
3. Uses contrafactual dependency to explain causation by two principles:
(1) Thesis: Contrafactual dependency is causation
(2) The cause of a cause is a cause.

Causation/Lewis: is transitive.
4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause.
5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. Information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel.
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I 322
Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar but also has differences. See Causal Explanation/Bigelow.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Causal Explanation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29