Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Everyone, all: “everyone” and “all” are colloquial forms, which are formalized in logic as quantifiers (universal quantifier). While "all" refers to a collective in general, "everyone" refers to individuals. E.g. everyone can win the lottery, but not all can win the lottery.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

P.F. Strawson on Each/All/Every - Dictionary of Arguments

I 200
"Any"/"all"/"nobody"/"nothing"/"something"/Strawson: these are all either singular nouns (A-expressions) or end with a singular relative pronoun.
Like nouns in the singular they do not have the character of B-expressions (predicates), and cannot occur in such places.
A-expressions/Strawson: nouns in singular
B-expressions/Strawson: predicates
I 201f
Difference A/B/Strawson: a series of statements can contain a constant B (predicate) and variable A-elements (singular nouns).
It could follow a statement that contains the same B-element but d no A.
Conversely: from this finding could none of the previous findings follow - i.e. in place of the A can occur variables. - (Quine ditto).
Cf. >Singular terms/Brandom
, >Predicates/Brandom.

>Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference, >Someone/Geach.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20
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