Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Is, philosophy: the word “is” has different functions like expressing an identity e.g. A is B, attributing a property e.g. the sky is blue or being contained in a set e.g. "Heaven" is a concept. These functions must not be confused. See also Copula, Predication, Equality, Equality sign, Equations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
G. Ryle on Is - Dictionary of Arguments
Grasses I 30 "Is"/RyleVsAristoteles: "systematically misleading locutions", "is" should suggest the appearance of a thing/property relationship. I 31 Error: the universal "human" is itself not a thing that breathes. Rather, it is to be interpreted as a class subordination. Russell: "If existence is a term of 2nd order, God cannot be a subject term". It would rather be predicate term like 'infinite beings". RyleVsRussell: e.g. Pegasus: here the problem is not in the subject term, but in the predicate term. >Pegasus-Example, >Existence predicate, cf. >Geach: two-term-theory, >Predication, cf. >Copula, >Levels(Order), >Second order logic._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19