Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Errors: An error is a deviation from accuracy or correctness. It can be a mistake in action, speech, or belief. Errors can be caused by human mistakes, computer faults, and incorrect measurement. See also Knoiwledge, Correctness, Confirmation, Falsification, Measurements, Observation, Certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Errors - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 106 Object/Acquaintance/Deception/Error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: Thesis: because one can be mistaken, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects ("illusion argument"). >Deceptions. I 335 Primary Language Games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: e.g. physiognomic language games - here doubts about certainty are useless. In primary language games, epistemological terms such as knowledge/belief/truth/error etc. do not occur. >Language games. I 339 Pain/Sensation/Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot be systematically mistaken in identifying my feelings. The connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical. II 59 Sense/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: what enables us to judge the world correctly also enables us to judge it wrongly. >Sense. II 62 Machine/Deception/Error/Mistake/Wittgenstein: the machine itself contains nothing that can be right or wrong - it runs as it does. II 103 Memory/Criteria/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: if you do not remember correctly, there must be another criterion besides memory. Then the memory itself is not tested. If one further asks: "how do you know?" You cannot help but say, "It seems to me." VI 188 Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Schulte: only if error is possible we can say that we are right. Therefore, we cannot be wrong about our own pain. Therefore, however, it is pointless to talk about "absolute safety". (No criteria!). >Criteria. VI 189 But I can be as wrong about the contents of my bag as anyone. VI 220/221 Error/Wittgenstein/Schulte: can one say: an error has not only a cause, but a reason? I.e. approximately, it can be classified into the correct knowledge of the one erring. (Wittgenstein, On Certainty § 74). Only those who have further knowledge can make a mistake in the relevant field. VII 152 Skepticism/Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Late: the words "error", "doubt", etc. were also learned by philosophers from everyday language; they were not invented for the purpose of philosophy. VII 153 Deception/Wittgenstein/Late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything ((s) "If everything were different..." > Skepticism/Davidson) then he uses the words in a way he would never use them in everyday life. VII 154 Wittgenstein: For example, one cannot say that one is wrong about something in one's joy._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Errors
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19