|Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not finished objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle.|
B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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Intuitionism/Putnam: here existence is intra-theoretical. - E.g. Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent with "There are electrons". - Intuitionistic: there is a description D such that "D is an electron" in B1 is provable - that could be true with appropriate theory, even if there were no electrons.
Intuitionism/PutnamVs: takes a strong aprioristic attitude towards mental entities, namely "meaning". - Also a platonist ability to capture constructive relations between them.
Pro Intuitionism: Löwenheim-paradox does not appear because "existence of a model" means to have a proof method - object/meaning/description: objects in constructive mathematics are given by descriptions. - These must not be attached with mysterious "glue" - reference is here given by the sense and sense through a verification process, not by truth conditions - there is then no "gap" between theory and objects - ((s) Truth conditions: when they are formulated linguistically, the significance could be shifted according to the law by Löwenheim - procedure: non-linguistical)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990