Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Introspection: introspection is the investigation of a self-conscious subject of its own inner states. Prerequisites are, among other things, the ability to distinguish interior from external influences, as well as at least to some extent the use of a public language. Moreover, the subject must be able to compare past internal and external states with present internal and external states, and must be able to deliberately distinguish itself from other subjects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Introspection - Dictionary of Arguments
I 117 Introspection/Searle: The model of face perception works on the assumption that there is a distinction between what is seen and what is seen. In introspection, there is no distinction to be made. >Consciousness, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. I 126 SearleVsIntrospection: introspection requires separation between act and object. I 168 Introspection/Searle: introspection is without problems, but it is not a specific skill. Wittgenstein: introspection is expressive and therefore not right or wrong. SearleVs: introspection does exist. Incorrigibility is pointless in relation to consciousness. Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception presupposes Cartesian dualism. >Dualism, >cartesianism, >incorrigibility._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Introspection
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19