Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Interpretation: A) Making statements about other statements, whereby new vocabulary may be introduced. If no new vocabulary is introduced, new information can be obtained by changing the syntactic grouping. B) In logic, interpretation is the insertion of values (objects) instead of the constants or free variables. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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D. Dennett on Interpretation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 237 Artifact/interpretation/Game of Life/Conway/Dennett: Question: are the "Eater", "Glider", etc. designed objects or natural formations? The easiest Glider arises obviously from the rules, no one had to make it. ((s) >Game of Life/Conway; Cf. > Objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). --- Fodor IV 137 Interpretation theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: (Brentano: Thesis: The intentional cannot be reduced to the physical). Dennett: i.e. ontologically, there are no such things as belief, desires, intentional phenomena! Interpretation: they are, however, indispensable as elements of interpretation (epistemic). ((s) That is, that intentionality (or its attribution) is accessible only by interpretation. ("Interpretivism", "interpretativism")). IV 138 Intentional attribution/Dennett: intentional attribution is always wrong. Because there is no intentionality which is ontological (merely as epistemically useful concepts), Vs intentional realism. >Attribution. Principle of Charity/Fodor/Lepore: must be intrinsically holistic, which is also accepted by Dennett. >Principle of Charity. Interpretation theory:/Fodor/Lepore: according to Dennett, there are two schools: 1. Def Projectivism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other the internal states that one would have oneself in the appropriate circumstances. 2. Def Normativism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other internal states which he should have in the circumstances. IV 139 There are, of course, close relations between normativism and holism. >Holism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |