Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference system, conceptual schema, immanence.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VI 389
Internal Realism/Putnam: empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. - In contrast, metaphysical realism: not empirical, but a model. (like billiard balls).
VI 400
Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. - Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. - Metaphysical Realism: asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. - internal realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. - This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional - hence the use is already explained.
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I (a) 18
Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory) - here use and reference are linked.
- - -
I (e) 151
Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-Realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. - Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge.
I (f) 156ff
Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent - truth: rationalized acceptability - brains in a vat are no possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective - observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. - The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. - Internalism: "Rabbit" refers just to rabbit.
I (f) 159
ExternalismVs: the does not tell us what reference is. - Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> Meaning Postulates) causality irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens - ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. - E.g. Natural type: basic concept for future horses.
I (f) 160
InternalismVs "of the same kind" does not make sense out of a category system. - Everything is kind of the same kind-. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. - VsInternalism: but so are self-identifying objects accepted (and the world arranges itself). - Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. - Solution: objects are made and discovered - then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-21
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