Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference system, conceptual schema, immanence.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Horwich I 389
Internal Realism/Putnam: empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. - In contrast, metaphysical realism: not empirical, but a model. (like billiard balls).
Horwich I 400
Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. - Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. - Metaphysical Realism: asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. - internal realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. - This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional - hence the use is already explained.
Putnam I 18
Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory) - here use and reference are linked.
I 151
Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-Realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. - Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge.
I 156ff
Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent - truth: rationalized acceptability - brains in a vat are no possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective - observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. - The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. - Internalism: "Rabbit" refers just to rabbit.
II 159
ExternalismVs: the does not tell us what reference is. - Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> meaning postulates) causality irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens - ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. - E.g. Natural type: basic concept for future horses.
II 160
InternalismVs "of the same kind" does not make sense out of a category system. - Everything is kind of the same kind-. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. - VsInternalism: but so are self-identifying objects accepted (and the world arranges itself). - Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. - Solution: objects are made and discovered - then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23