Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments
Davidson II 112 SearleVsDavidson: Davidson suggests to distinguish two types of intentions: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action". Intentional acts only occur when the first, causes the second. --- Dennett I 281 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". (see below) --- Dennett II 67 Definition derived intentionality/Searle: definition derived intentionality is a limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. E.g. a shopping list, whether written or memorized, likewise, mental pictures, something internal - these things are still an art product. --- Searle I 67 Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary. Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality are intrinsic. The Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative. I 178 Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Aspect/Searle. I 266f Intentional phenomena: regulating consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality only arises through interest-based descriptions here. Rules are no cause of action. >Rule following. Objects of intentionality need not to exist: hope, belief, fear, wishes - there is no record of them, one just has them. >Object/Searle. --- II 208 Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act. - Double level of intentionality: a) mental state b) level of intention. --- III 156 As-if intentionality/Searle: the as-if intentionality explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude". >Intentionality/Dennett. --- Graeser I 124 Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional. Derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves. >Speech act._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19