Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Dav II 112
SearleVsDavidson: suggests to distinguish two types of intentions:
a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action" intentional act only when the first, causes the second.
Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality".
Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. Shopping list, whether written or memorized. Likewise, mental pictures. Something internal, but still an art product.
Searle I 67
Intentionality biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary.
Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality intrinsic - the Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
I 178
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned.
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: Regulating consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: are only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-based description here - rules no cause of action.
Objects of intentionality need not to exist: (hope)
belief, fear, wishes, belief no record, one just has them.
II 208
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act - double level of intentionality: a) mental state - b) level of intention.
III 156
As-if intentionality/Searle: explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power - SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude".
Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional - derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-22