Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Th. Kuhn on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments
Diaz-Bone I 115 Kuhn: Abstention in the area of non-evident knowledge is not possible! E.g. Columbus based his actions on the hypothesis of a new continent. The sheer determination to discover something is not sufficient. Diaz-Bone I 116 So there are cases where an event cannot happen if there is no belief in its happening beforehand. Cf. >Observation language, >Observation, >Measuring._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Kuhn
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19