Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.
 
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I 132
Intentionality/Geach: three-digit relation: person-verb-object. - E.g. For a z, z is a man and I saw z in Oxford under the aspect: "ran past". - GeachVsBuridan: "ratio", "appeals to", "regard": here there are no identity conditions. - There is no need for the subject to be perceived under this aspect. - E.g. Buridan: Socrates knows that some stars are above the horizon." - Geach: Suppose, Socrates is in the jungle, from which does he know?
Buridan: "of those who are it". - GeachVs: only of "some", not e.g. from the constellation Aries (false aspect). - Incorrect complex expression: "Socrates, knows that Aries over ..." - GeachVsBuridan: exploits here the peculiarity of "know". (from knowledge follows truth).
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I 137
Intentional Identity/Intentionality/Geach: E.g.
1. "There is a poet whom Smith and Brown admire" - or
2. "Smith and Brown admire both the same poet"
The latter would also be true if it was a high-stacker.
"Under the description"/Aspect: Problem: E.g. Smith dreamed of the world's fattest woman, who is actually red-haired, but in the dream she was bald. - The medieval problems are still not solved today. - ((s)> de re,> de dicto).

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28