Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
II 65 ff
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality.
II 110
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality.

II 135 ff
The intentionalistic predicates are essentially normative.
Dav I 26
Intentional states/Davidson: analogy for measurement: are assumed, but not as entities (weight is not an entity for itself, but a property of the object) - intentions do not have to live in the brain as weights do not live in the object. They do not need to play a physiological role, just as numbers play no physical role. Therefore: if the subject does not find any entities here, it does not follow that it does not know what it thinks.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26