Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intensional objects: intensional objects are objects of thought which may or may not correspond to external objects. Properties can be attributed to these objects, which cannot be attributed in any case to external objects. For example, dreamed things and situations with physically impossible properties. A fundamental problem is that in every discussion it must be ensured that the objects which can be disputed are not only intensional. A special problem is the status of intensional objects to which the object character is denied. See also mentalism, intensions, thought objects.
 
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VII 152
Intensional objects/Quine: are no classes, but class terms or attributes (properties) - are not numbers but number names (number terms) - two open sentences which specify the same class, still determine different properties if they are not analytically equivalent - Vs: equivalence unresolved - problem: this further swells the realm of the intensional objects - problem: wrong: "Any two conditions which determine an x as the only one (unique) are analytically equivalent" - that’s not certain with intensional objects or with true but non-analytical sentences (planets).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensional Objects



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26