Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intensional objects: intensional objects are objects of thought which may or may not correspond to external objects. Properties can be attributed to these objects, which cannot be attributed in any case to external objects. For example, dreamed things and situations with physically impossible properties. A fundamental problem is that in every discussion it must be ensured that the objects which can be disputed are not only intensional. A special problem is the status of intensional objects to which the object character is denied. See also mentalism, intensions, thought objects.
 
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I 115
Defensive object/Cresswell: is an object which is a different thing (or several things) in different possible worlds (poss.w.) - Hintikka: better: game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - whereby the first player tries, to make the proposition true, and the second to make it false - CresswellVsHintikka: the examples should be better understood in this way that they include normal quantification, but above entities of higher order, e.g. classes of individuals.
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I 120
Intensional objects/Cresswell: a) new in every possible world - b) always from the actual world - CresswellVs: instead with Russell: predicate S: "is the largest wooden building" - then disambiguate: (13) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) ). Nfy) - ((s) There is only one most beautiful and that is necessary wooden) (14) N (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y).fy)-((s) There is neccessarily only one most beautiful and that is wooden (14), although both are wrong only (14) fails because the uniqueness of S is not logically guaranteed.
Solution: the following is true instead of (14): (15) (E1x) (Xs. N ((E1x) Sx> (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . fy)) - N.B.: but the data of these variables are normal things, not intensional objects.
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I, 122 ff
Intensional objects/Cresswell: Problem. E.g. (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world - (19) O (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . Ofy) - (19) is not equivalent to (20) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) .fy) - because (19) is wrong in w1 because the thing that is the largest wooden building in w2 is not wooden in w1 - (20) is true, however, because the largest wooden building in any possible world is, of course, in this (s) same possible world wooden - Intensional object: according to this view we should treat the description "The largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere" as a name - then we must consider the form of (18) as (21) OOfs. - but OOfs is equivalent to fs, whatever an intensional object is attributed to s - therefore the meaning of (18) expressed by (19) cannot be captured by (21) - complex property: "in the other world wooden".

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


> Counter arguments against Cresswell
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensional Objects



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23