Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intensionality: Intensionality is a semantic property of certain expressions that means that their meaning is not determined solely by their reference. E.g., "The morning star" refers to Venus as the object that appears in the sky in the morning, while "the evening star" refers to Venus as the object that appears in the sky in the evening. See also Reference, Meaning, Intensions, Extensions, Extensionality. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Intensionality - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 251 Intensional language/compositionality/Lewis: here for intensional language: here it applies only to intensions, not to extensions. - Tradition: knew only extensional languages. - Intensional language: extensions depend on the context. Cf. >extensionality, >intensions. --- IV 253 New: Intension-determining rules - allow composite modal operators and quantifiers. - If only intensional rules, the extensions disappear - then we only have semantic values of one level instead of two. --- IV 257 Intensional language: here teh sub-sentences are only S names (sentence names without truth value), no sentences. --- IV 260 Intensional language/extensional/Lewis: the difference is so hard to grasp that it hardly makes a difference which we use. - Greater difference: if a language can be formally analyzed or not. - Ontology: for it, it is only important whether suspect entities have to be assumed - which does not coincide with the difference internal/external._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18