Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Intensionality: Intensionality is a semantic property of certain expressions that means that their meaning is not determined solely by their reference. E.g., "The morning star" refers to Venus as the object that appears in the sky in the morning, while "the evening star" refers to Venus as the object that appears in the sky in the evening. See also Reference, Meaning, Intensions, Extensions, Extensionality. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Brandom on Intensionality - Dictionary of Arguments
I 373 Intensional/Brandom: is description-dependent - intentionality is always intensional. Action: is extensional. >Actions. intentional: is an action where the description appears as the conclusion in practical reasoning. Davidson: Reasons do not need to be good. >Reasons. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |