Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
 
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I 226
Meaning / Reference / Frege / Geach: his distinction is not the same as between intension / extension.
I 227
Term /Concepts/ Frege: purely extensional view - therefore no "sense of the name" - but reference of the predicate - ((s) Reference / (s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). - but: Extension / Frege: object - Concept / Frege: no object - the reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated - "red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26