Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Geach on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 226 Meaning/reference/Frege/Geach: Frege's distinction is not the same as between intension/extension. >Extension, >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. I 227 Term/Concepts/Frege: Frege has a purely extensional view. - Therefore there is no "sense of the name" but reference of the predicate. >Extensionality, >Predicate/Frege, >Sense, >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege. ((s) Reference/(s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). But: Extension/Frege: = object Concept/Frege: no object. The reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated. "Red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name. ((s) The concepts "intension" and "extension" were coined later by Carnap.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20