|Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.|
Books on Amazon
Meaning / Reference / Frege / Geach: his distinction is not the same as between intension / extension.
Term /Concepts/ Frege: purely extensional view - therefore no "sense of the name" - but reference of the predicate - ((s) Reference / (s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). - but: Extension / Frege: object - Concept / Frege: no object - the reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated - "red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972