Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
 
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II 45
Intension/Extension > thought is not meaning (reference) of the sentence (but the content).

Dum I 18
Frege: first reference, then "sense" - ((s) thus the extension determines the intension?).
Dum I 48
Reference/Frege: theory of reference before the theory of "sense" - "sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense".
I ~ 48
Use/Frege/Dummett use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege) - ((s) contrary to the above?) - meaning different from reference: E.g. Unicorn.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


> Counter arguments against Frege
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30