Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. Frege on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments
Frege II 45 Intension/Extension: the thought is not the meaning (Fregean reference) of the sentence (but the content). For the terminology see also >Fregean Sense. ((s) The terms 'intension' and 'extension' come from Carnap and were not used by Frege himself). Sense/Frege: sense corresponds to the intension. >Way of givenness. Extension: the extension is the object. >Object, >Extension. - - - Dummett I 18 Def "sense" of an expression/Frege: is the way in which its reference is given. Therefore we must first have the concept of the reference. But if we now have the concept of the reference before that of the sense, we cannot claim that the reference is a property of the sense, but only a property of the expression! This becomes clear in the Basic Laws, where Frege determines the interpretation of his symbolism through determinations which prescribe each expression its respective reference. Taken together, these determinations determine for each formula under which conditions it is true. The sense is to be mentioned later. Accordingly, the determinations would be incomprehensible if the concept of the reference to an expression had been derived. I 18 Frege then later explains the sense by referring to the determinations that regulate the reference. >Fregean sense, >Reference. Dummett I 48 Reference/Frege: theory of reference was there before the theory of "sense". "Sense" determines the reference. Husserl: reference equals "sense": The sense determines the relation (the "meaning") in the strong sense that it is - assuming the facts of the world - the factual sense of an expression that explains how it is given its factual "meaning" (relation). (Not only Evans' "weak" sense that no two expressions can have the same sense, but different "meanings" (reference). Thus, a theory of reference is not yet a theory of sense, but its indispensable basis. Not unlike Frege, Husserl takes the view that the sense of an expression is a constitutive element to which it owes its respective reference. >Sense/Husserl. Dummett I 48f Use/Frege/Dummett: the use gives the meaning. The meaning gives the reference (Frege). Meaning is not equal to reference: e.g. unicorn: the term is not meaningless, therefore one knows only that it does not refer to any object. I 48ff Use/Frege/Dummett: use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege). Meaning is different from reference: e.g. unicorn. >Non-existence, >Use, >Unicorn example._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Frege
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18