|Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Intension/Extension > thought is not meaning (reference) of the sentence (but the content).
Dum I 18
Frege: first reference, then "sense" - ((s) thus the extension determines the intension?).
Dum I 48
Reference/Frege: theory of reference before the theory of "sense" - "sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense".
I ~ 48
Use/Frege/Dummett use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege) - ((s) contrary to the above?) - meaning different from reference: E.g. Unicorn._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993