|Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.|
Books on Amazon
Definition intension: functions from indices to extensions. A more robust type of content that is shared by the listener in the best case.
Functions of the kind in question are so finely individuated that it is difficult to see how the use of an expression may determine that sometimes this and sometimes another function should be associated with it. (among others, reason for QuineVsIntensions). Quine: reference instead of meaning.
The difficulty with such an approach is exactly the one stressed by Quine: what exactly of these practices deserves to be characterized in a way that it deals with some assertions and inferences as privileged? This can only be set for artificial languages.
Intension/Extension/BrandomVsTradition: three-stage instead of two-stage approach: 1) inferential significance fundamental 2) extensional dimension in concepts of substitution-inferential definitions - 3) equivalence classes of expressions that correspond to what is being spoken about. Tradition: leaves out communication dimension - Brandom: Content not as a function, rather as practical account management.
Meaning/Reference/Sense/Frege/Brandom: only in the interaction with the world that lies outside the mind the "sense" determines the "meaning"; this has nothing to do with representation intentions, but certainly with success.
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001