Dictionary of Arguments

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Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Wright I 278
Content/Contents/Wittgenstein: all substantive has softened. There are no relevant facts.
Wittgenstein I 204
Content/Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the sentence "no object is red and green at the same time" is true for logical reasons but not for reasons of content.
Brandom I 133
Content/Tractatus/Brandom: needs not to be representational: e.g. logical vocabulary has content, but stands for nothing. Not every move in a language game represents something.
IV 20
Indoor/Outdoor/Tractatus: 3.13 The sentence includes everything that belongs to the projection, but not what is projected.
IV 21
So the possibility of the projected, not this itself.
The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.
The sentence contains the form of its meaning, but not its content.
VI 213
We all too easily conclude that sentences that are undoubtedly fixed are sentences whose content is known.
Example 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say that one "knows" the like?
Thesis: If doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is inappropriate.
VII 85
World/Subject/Status/Position/Power/Tetens: analogously: I cannot look over my own shoulder when looking at the world. I, as the subject of my perception, do not appear as part of the world I perceive. I as a subject am not content, not object of perception.
VII 86
Subject/Tetens: I can never completely catch up with and objectify myself as a subject. I fall out of the content as a subject.
VII 91
Subject: shrinks to what has the thought - but not as part of the content of the thought.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-11-15
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