Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I XIV
Schiffer/Early: ultimately we need a theory of content. - Block: reductionism helps nothing, if it has nothing to say about what has been reduced. - E.g. "worms without noses": does this have a language-independent content?
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I 182
Mental content/Schiffer: there is no plausible theory of mental content - therefore Vs propositions as objects of belief. (VsRrelation Theory).
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I 233
SchifferVsDummett: if we subtract all the conditions for evidence that cannot be formulated in terms of observation or depend on indirect knowledge, then the identity conditions for the terms will no longer be the same - therefore the direct verification conditions will not grasp the content.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-20