|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content - Content/Kant: Thoughts without content are empty - Concept/Kant: views without concepts are blind.
I 157 ff
Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content (whether we agree with it or not).
Content/McDowell: is not something that you put together yourself. The conceptual skills were already at work before you have a choice.
Content/Meaning/Quine/McDowell: therefore, "empirical meaning" is not the same as content. If you call content an attitude about how things of the empirical world are. (Quine: "conceptual sovereignty").
Content/Quine: Result of the freely acting spontaneity that is not controlled by the material of receptivity.
Rorty VI 216
"Content"/McDowell/Rorty: the review of certain words proves that they have no empirical content: E.g. "witch", "phlogiston", "boche" (a French expression for German). These are pseudo-concepts. The more we learn about the world, the greater is the number of our real concepts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000