Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Berka I 85
Content/Frege: function of an argument - concept forming - subject: argument - predicate: function.
Berka I 86
Not every content can be assessed: E.g. the image house.
Berka I 87
Affirmation/Frege: refers to the whole of content and judgment.
Berka I 88
Against: Negation/Denial: is part of the content, not to the judgment.
Berka I 87
Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): What is common to passive and active. - ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn. - This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument.
Berka I 96
Content Identity/Frege: differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. - Two names have the same content. - Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. - E.g. In geometry, the same point can have different meanings. - Therefore, you must use two different names first to show that later. - Different names are not a mere formality. - Spelling: Triple bar ≡ - refers to conceptual content. - Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1)

1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
- - -
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47
Content/Frege: intension, way of givenness.
II 57ff
Content/Sentence/Frege: can be true or false.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

SL I
R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

Stuhlmann II
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-19
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