|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp).
Contents/Content/Field/(s): is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics.
Belief state/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described:
a) as belief state that snow is white and
b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white.
N.B.: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994