|Inflationism, philosophy: Inflationism, (usually not so-called), requires, in addition to determining whether a statement is true, the specification of conditions under which it is true. From this a truth-definition is to be obtained. The opposite term is the deflationism, that assumes that the truth schema S <> [p] with the example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white sufficient for a truth definition for formal languages. This latter view is also called disquotationalism, because the quotation is deprived of its quotes to the left of the equivalence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Inflationism/Horwich: requires attributing additional properties to truth 'X is true iff. X has the property P.' - This is supposed to allow us to specify what truth is. (E.g. utility). - >Pragmatism.
Deflationism/Quine/Leeds/Horwich: (deflationary) truth allows generalizations of a certain kind for which you'd otherwise need infinite conjunctions. - Quine: truth serves the purpose of generalization - Horwich: E.g. generalization: for each object x if x = what Einstein said, then x is true._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994