Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Inflationism, philosophy: Inflationism, (usually not so-called), requires, in addition to determining whether a statement is true, the specification of conditions under which it is true. From this a truth-definition is to be obtained. The opposite term is the deflationism, that assumes that the truth schema S <> [p] with the example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white sufficient for a truth definition for formal languages. This latter view is also called disquotationalism, because the quotation is deprived of its quotes to the left of the equivalence.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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II 104
Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory.
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II 104
Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. - Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism.
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II 126
Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white).
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II 114
Deflationism: can assume facts.
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II
Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p".
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II 126
Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks - inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts).
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II 220
Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy.
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II 230
Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald" - Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositional. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension" - Definition strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator: "Jones is in some, but not in all extensions".


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-24