Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Induction: Induction in logic is a type of reasoning in which we draw general conclusions from specific observations. It is the opposite of deductive reasoning, where we draw specific conclusions from general premises. See also Deduction, Grue, Generalization, Generality, Conclusions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Induction - Dictionary of Arguments
III 50 Induction/Mackie: Mackie is per inductive (probability) counterfactual conditionals. (>Counterfactual conditionals). ArmstrongVsMackie - but: Armstrong per induction: it is rational. III 52 Induction/Armstrong: Induction from the observed to the unobserved: are invalid, nevertheless necessarily(!) rational. - Because of the conclusion to the Best Explanation. If not best explanation, what should be better? - The unobserved will behave like the observed (alternatives are more poorly justified). >Best Explanation. III 58 Induction/Logical Possibility: that all emeralds are grue has the same logical possibility (percentage) as that they are green - the observed emeralds are green - but they are also grue - the mathematics is the same. - - - II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a higher order atomic state that connects the universals._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20