Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Individuation, philosophy: the picking out of an object by a determination by means of additional information which is not to be derived from a single statement which contains this object. For example, beliefs are individualized by content, not e.g. by the length of the character strings with which they are expressed. The contents of a belief are, in turn, not individuated by their repetition, but by other contents.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
II 71ff
I/Self/Individuation/Nozick: E.g. three completely bandaged persons with amnesia: X will die, Y will live, Z has 50/50 chance: they have to be moved into separate rooms: "the one who now hears my voice" - not sufficient: Localization: (due to possible blindness), life history (for amnesia), physical description (ditto) - name: insufficient: E.g. Oedipus - originator of the tokens: not sufficient.: oral cavity + vocal chords ditto - consciousness.. . not sufficient: God covers the same description - Reference/((s): someone could use "I" as the name of someone else.)


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-12-14