|Individuation, philosophy: the picking out of an object by a determination by means of additional information which is not to be derived from a single statement which contains this object. For example, beliefs are individualized by content, not e.g. by the length of the character strings with which they are expressed. The contents of a belief are, in turn, not individuated by their repetition, but by other contents._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Gareth Evans on Individuation - Dictionary of Arguments
Individuation/Evans: Mind state: a specification always needs a general term when it is directed to an object. - Nevertheless, reference to certain objects seems possible more directly than to others. - Otherwise no reference would be identifiable in a cyclic universe.
((s) If there were only general terms, there would be no chance to find out whether we were in an "eternal recurrence".)
Individuation/Information/Evans: Information is individuated by its origin. - Therefore: Identity statements are necessary: if A is the source of information, it could not have been anything else! - Demonstratives/Evans: are explained inter alia as follows: no one else can be source of information than this mountaineer, if it is said, "this mountaineer comes to the city today." This is precisely why we can also have false ideas about him._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989