Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Immanence, philosophy: A set of statements is immanent if it respects the concepts and the subject domain as well as the usage rules of the concepts of a theory. Possible extensions of the subject domain, the terms and their application rules are the subject of a discussion, which in turn takes place within the theory. Antonym Transcendence. See also Extension, Introduction._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on Immanence - Dictionary of Arguments
II 33 Def immanence principle/ Berkeley / Rutte: "real external thing": absurd, because otherwise there would have to be thoughts that are thought by nobody. VsBerkeley: confusion between "not intended" and independent thought. - Objects that are independent from thinking therefore do not have to exist. Berkeley: there is no specific experience for verifications - we can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. >Reality, >Verification, >Intentions, >Reference. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20