Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Identity theory (philosophy of the mind): the thesis that mind states are nothing but states of the brain. Types of identity theory are the weaker assumption of a type-type identity and the stronger assumption of a token-token identity.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

Gerhard Vollmer on Identity Theory - Dictionary of Arguments

I 271
Identity Theory / Vollmer: no evidence of neurophysiology will ever be sufficient to prove the identity theory - reason: explanation: - which can be explained by the assumption of an entity, always can be explained by the adoption of two entities.
II 90
Identity / identity theory / Vollmer: ((s) here: identity of the mind with a physical realization): not all properties must match - e.g the optical and haptic impression of an apple are not identical. - ((s)Vs: these are extrinsic properties.)


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Vollmer
> Counter arguments in relation to Identity Theory

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-05-15
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration