Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Hintikka I 22
Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts.
Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322)
I 140 Note
Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions.
I 364
Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their >identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games.
In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence.
II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule.
WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign.
II 338/339
Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set.
If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing?
What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity.
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity.
II 418
Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists.
IV 103
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides.
VI 179
Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation.
VI 183
Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description.
But for my pain? No criterion!

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-22