Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) it is agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. >Facts, >States of affairs. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322) I 140 Note Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. --- Wittgenstein I 364 Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. >Language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence. >Evidence. --- Wittgenstein II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. >Rules. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign. --- II 338/339 Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing? What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity. II 416 WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. --- IV 103 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. >Equations. --- VI 179 Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. VI 183 Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. >Criteria. But for my pain? There is no criterion! >Pain._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Identity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16