|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.|
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|EMD II 289f
Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: (4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)].
Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde.
EMD II 292
Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. - WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work.
Simons I 115
Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). - N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail) - although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. - Process: cannot be split. - Difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object - therefore QuineVsModality de re - here differ sum and process, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects.
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Parts Oxford New York 1987