Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell

Prior I 163
Identity/Russell: "a=a" "the a is the a" is false if there is no a or if there are multiple a - Def self-identity/Russell: nevertheless Russell’s Law "x = x" is part of his system - "For some (any) f if x ft, then ft x" - if we define individual existence as Lesniewkian self-identity, then it comes out at a class which must be regarded as a class of one and which can be predicted from some, but not from all classes
- - -
R I 58
Identity/Principia Mathematica/Russell: no judgment! E.g. we do not judge that Socrates = Socrates. - In a way, we judge an ambiguous case of propositional function (propositional function) "A is A".
A propos I 111f
Containment/Identity/Element relations/Equal sign/Epsilon/Principia Mathematica/(s): therefore containment must not be the same as identity, otherwise from the right
i'x = i'x
follows the wrong
i'x ε i'x
i.e., a class may not be the identical with its (perhaps only) element.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-24