|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Pauen I 161
Identity/Kripke/Pauen: Thesis: identity must be necessary if it is to be identity at all - E.g. either it is true in all worlds that C-fiber irritation is identical with pain or it is not true in any - they are not identical then.
VsKripke/Pauen: there seems to be an argument against it: heat is also a rigid designation expression (kinetic energy) but we can imagine a world in which we have heat sensation without molecular motion - KripkeVsVs: then it is about heat sensation, not heat. - Imaginability/Pauen: is crucial for Kripke. - The imaginability of pain, which are not irritated C-fibers, eliminates the identity. - Today largely accepted: that psychophysical identity, if it exists at all, must be necessary._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001