Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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I 218
Identity/GeachVsFrege: is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). - VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity.
I 226
Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive.
I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this).
Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema.
(1)l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. - From this we derive the law of self-identity:
"l-a = a".
Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us:
(2)l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a"
I 240
Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity.
Tugendhat I 37
Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects.
- - -
Habermas IV 158
Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach).
E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient.

1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-24