﻿ Gottlob Frege on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments

# Dictionary of Arguments

Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Frege II 65
Identity/Frege: E.g. a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". - But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". - >judgment, >epistemological value, >non-trivial identity.
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Dummett III 70f
Identity/VsFrege/Dummett: (Informative/Uninformative) Example a = b: some: in order to understand this, you need to know - if it is true - that it is true - Important argument: then it does not provide information. - FregeVs: there’s no need to know if two expressions designate the same object if you understand the expressions. ((s) You can also know the "general" reference.) - ((s) The intentions may just be different.)
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Frege II 40
Identity/Statement/Assertion of Identity/Identity Statement/Frege: E.g. a = b: does not say anything about signs, but about objects. - Otherwise, no insight would be expressed by this, because signs are arbitrary anyway. - So it is not about "a" and "b" meaning the same thing. - That would be a statement about signs. - ((s) Instead: that they are different modes of givenness of the same object - (manner of givenness/(s): is not the sign)!.
II 65
Identity/Frege: a = b: Meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". - But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". Identity/Frege: same meaning, different sense. - Notion: therefore, the thought expressed by "a = a" is different from that expressed by "a = b".

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21